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Abstract
Business processes represent the operational capabilities of an organization. In order to ensure process continuity, the effective management of risk becomes an area
of key concern. In this paper we propose an approach for
supporting risk identification with the use of higher-level
organizational models. We provide some intuitive metrics for extracting measures of actor criticality, and vulnerability from organizational models. This helps direct
risk management to areas of critical importance within
organization models. Additionally, the information can be
used to assess alternative organizational structures in
domains where risk mitigation is crucial. At the process
level, these measures can be used to help direct improvements to the robustness and failsafe capabilities of critical
or vulnerable processes. We believe our novel approach,
will provide added benefits when used with other approaches to risk management during business process
management, that do not reference the greater organizational context during risk assessment.

1. Introduction
A Business Process can be described as a set of dynamically coordinated activities, controlled by a number
of socially dependant participants, aimed towards the
achievement of a specific operational objective [7] [11].
Business Process Management is a re-emerging discipline,
aimed towards supporting the effective and automated [11]
management of business processes within an organization
via specialized tools and methods. Business Process
Management promotes that a clear understanding through
the explicit modelling of the processes underlying an
organization is required to support effective organizational management / improvement practices [4].
An effective means to represent and manage operational risk is one of the most important capabilities within
an enterprise. Some of the most prominent applications
of risk management techniques include financial / operational management and modelling of organizations. Risk
management techniques have also been extensively studied and applied within software process management,
requirements engineering and project management disciplines [20] [24]. More recently, risk management has
been applied to the business process management and
modelling domain that as a whole, aims to bridge the gap

between organizational and I.T. level conceptual / management concerns [16] [18] [19]. These approaches
provide a more direct association between organizational
risks at an activity level.
There are difficulties associated to addressing risk at
process level. We believe that by taking actor-level considerations such as vulnerability and criticality (at organizational level) as major considerations is important for
process-level risk management. We provide an approach
to support risk management by supporting the identification of risk factors (in terms of vulnerability and criticality)
at organizational level prior to their propagation and
reflection at a process level. We believe that such an
approach will provide a higher-level scope for risk that
may span numerous processes within an organization.
Business process risk analysis should be based on
higher-level organizational models. A high-level approach
to iterative risk assessment should be integrated throughout the business process lifecycle. Therefore, risks may be
identified and managed at an organizational level prior to
their delegation to actual business processes. We provide an enhanced capability to relate risk at an organizational level by looking at the strategic relationships between functional units and process participants. We define
risk at organizational model level on the basis of vulnerability and criticality. For organizational modelling we use
the agent-oriented organizational modelling notation – i*
[13] that describes the organizational relationships among
various actors and their rationales. For business process
model representation we use a standardized, operational
and executable process modelling notation – BPMN [12].
The authors consider that the majority of risks identified
lie in mismatch with the methods employed within the
various phases of the process lifecycle, a lack of clarity
who is responsible for the individual phases or their results and a mismatch of process design, automation and
evaluation objects. We believe that risk can be better
viewed by using a combined notation proposed in [12].
The following section starts with a discussion of risk
and risk management and our chosen notations. We then
describe our approach to identify risk factors including
our proposed measurement for vulnerability and criticality
of actors at organizational level. Finally we illustrate the
integration of risk factors in process model with examples
and then some concluding remarks.
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2. Background
Agent Oriented Conceptual Modelling
The agent metaphor is powerful in modelling organizational contexts. Agent-Oriented Conceptual Modelling
(AOCM) in notations such as the i* framework [13] (see:
figure 1) have gained considerable currency in the recent
past. Such notations model rich organizational contexts
and offer high-level social/anthropomorphic abstractions
(such as goals, tasks, soft goals and dependencies) as
modelling constructs.
It has been argued that notations such as i* help answer
questions such as what goals exist, how key actors depend
on each other and what alternatives must be considered.
Furthermore, i* has been acknowledged as illustrating the
key social/strategic inter-relationships between actors [6]
[13] required for effective business process redesign.
This is achieved via support for reasoning about organizational activities and their assignment to various organizational agents [13] in respect to: the ability, workability,
viability, and believability of their routines; and, level of
commitment [13].
The central concept in i* is that of intentional actor.
These can be seen in the Meeting Scheduling model as
nodes representing the intentional/social relationships
between three (3) actors required to schedule a meeting: a
Meeting Initiator (MI); Meeting Scheduler (MS); and
Meeting Participant (MP).
The i* framework consists of two modelling components: Strategic Dependency (SD) Models and Strategic
Rationale (SR) Models [13]. The SD model consists of a
set of nodes and links. Each node represents an actor, and
each link between the two actors indicates that one actor
depends on the other for something (i.e. goals, task, resource, and soft-goal) in order that the former may attain
some goal. The depending actor is known as depender,
while the actor depended upon is known as the dependee.
The object around which the dependency relationship
centers is called the dependum. The SR mode further
represents internal motivations and capabilities (i.e. processes or routines) accessible to specific actors that ensure
dependencies can be met.
The intentional properties of an agent such as goals,
beliefs, abilities and commitments are used in i* for modelling organizations [13]. Actors are [inter]related through
dependencies that may involve goals to be achieved (e.g.
Evacuation & RescueMission), tasks to be performed (e.g.
GatheringLocalInformation), resources to be furnished
(e.g. FieldInformation), or soft-goals to be satisfied (e.g.
RespondFast).
Business Process Modelling with BPMN
Many existing BPM notations primarily focus on technical process aspects including the flow of activity execution/information and/or resource usage/consumption [13].
This perspective is aimed at describing the sequence of
activities, events and decisions that are made during

process execution, however social and intentional components lack representation. The technical focus of these
notations is especially suited for applications in the description, execution and simulation of business processes
but is lacking in support for process redesign and improvement [13].
One such notation is the Business Process Modelling
Notation (BPMN), developed by the Business Process
Management Initiative (BPMI.org). BPMN can be seen
as primarily a technically-oriented notation that is augmented with an ability to assign activity execution control
to entities (e.g. roles) within an organization with
‘swim-lanes’. This effectively provides a view of the
responsibilities and required communications between
classes of process participants, but does not provide a view
of other social and intentional characteristics including the
goals of participants and their inter-dependencies.
Processes are represented in BPMN using flow nodes:
events (circles), activities (rounded boxes), and decisions
(diamonds); connecting objects: control flow links (unbroken directed lines), and message flow links (broken
directed lines); and swim-lanes: pools (high-level rectangular container), and lanes partitioning pools. These
concepts are further discussed within [12].
Since its initial publication [12], BPMN has been accepted by the greater Business Process Management
community [1] [11], due to its expressiveness and ability to
map directly to executable process languages including
XPDL [4] and BPEL [10] [12]. The wide uptake of the
notation by most Business Process Modelling tool vendors
is also a sign of its longevity [4]. Some practitioners have
hailed BPMN as supplying a rich representation that
allows Business Process Management Systems (BPMS)
the ability to control the required interactions with humans
and 3rd party applications [9]. Furthermore, an analysis of
BPMN also stated its high maturity in representing concepts required for modelling business process, apart from
some limitations in terms of representing state, and the
possible ambiguity of the swim-lane concept [1].

3. Identifying Risk within Organizational
Models

In this section we will describe our intuitive approach to
analysis and design with regards to organizational risk. In
order to achieve this task, we propose an analysis of strategic dependencies between actors in order to measure and
identify each actor’s vulnerability and criticality. Once
determined, the design task will be focused towards the
area of process modelling that requires most attention.
Vulnerability
The vulnerability of an actor plays a vital role for identifying and measuring risk. The i* model provides an
intentional description of a process in terms of a network of
dependency relationships among actors [13]. We believe
because of its richer modelling concepts, the model pro-

31st Annual International Computer Software and Applications Conference(COMPSAC 2007)
0-7695-2870-8/07 $25.00 © 2007

vides a better basis for an analyst to explore the broader
risk implications of alternative organizational structure. It
can help analyze opportunities and vulnerabilities and
recognize patterns of relationship. A depender actor’s
intention is to have the dependency goal achieved, task
performed, or resource available. Failure to obtain the
dependum can affect the process by making it more vulnerable and hence increasing the likelihood of risk occurrence. In our work we propose a way of measuring vulnerability of actors at organizational model. The analyst
can then take necessary steps to mitigate these vulnerabilities in process models. A stronger degree of vulnerability implies that a stronger initiative to mitigate vulnerability is necessary. Such initiative can be taken by
increasing the monitoring process of dependee actor’s
activities.
We propose a metric for actor vulnerability. This metric
is effectively divides the number of outgoing dependencies
by the number of dependee actors. A depender actor with
more outgoing dependencies implies a greater degree of
vulnerability. We consider outgoing dependencies for
vulnerability measurement as we believe that outgoing
dependencies indicate delegation of tasks and activities. If
the tasks are delegated to other actors the depender actor
becomes vulnerable. In case of the failure of dependee
actor to satisfy the dependency, the corresponding
task/goal might not be satisfied (a considerable risk). The
vulnerability of actors thus is related to the likelihood of a
risk occurring. We believe if an actor is vulnerable, an
increase in the overall likelihood of risk occurrence is
apparent. Intuitively, if the likelihood increases risk will
increase as well.
The formula we use to assess the vulnerability measurement (VM) of actors is as follows:
VM =No of Outgoing Dependencies / No of Dependee
Actors
For example, for actor EmergencyCoordinationCentreCoordinator,
No of Outgoing dependencies = 12
No of Dependee Actors = 4
So, Vulnerability, VM= (12/4) = 3
Table 1: Vulnerability Measurement of Actors
Name of the No of Out- No of De- VulnerActor
going
De- pendee
pendencies Actors
ability
Emergency
Coordination
Centre Coordinator

12

4

3

Weather Bureau

0

0

None

Call Taking

0

0

None

Supervisor/
System
Volunteer/Emergency
Workers

4

2

2

Flood Control
Centre Coordinator

7

3

2.33

Community

8

3

2.66

In a softgoal-dependency, a depender depends on the
dependee to perform certain goals or task that would
enhance the performance. The notion of a softgoal derives
from the Non-Functional Requirements (NFR) framework
[2] and is commonly used to represent optimization objectives, preferences or specifications of desirable (but not
necessarily essential) states of affairs. So, softgoals are
non-functional requirements of the system, which have
positive or negative contribution toward achieving a goal,
task, or resource. While measuring the vulnerability of
actors we do not included the softgoal dependencies. We
believe these non-functional requirements of the system
have minimal impact on risk either in the organizational
level or on the process level. When we calculate the
outgoing dependencies of actors we exclude the softgoal
dependency.
If any actor has no outgoing dependency with other
actors, we do not take that actor for vulnerability measurement. We believe such actor has no vulnerability as it
can not affect the likelihood of occurrence. From figure-1
we find that the actors WeatherBureau and CallTakingSuperviosr/System do not have any outgoing dependencies.
It means they have not delegated their responsibilities or
tasks to other actors. But, actor with no vulnerability does
not necessarily mean that it is not critical enough to affect
the consequences if it fails. In this case criticality of the
actor is considered to measure the risk.
Criticality
Criticality is the consequence factor that is measured
from the impact of an actor’s performance where the actor
is assigned to satisfy responsibilities/incoming dependencies. The more critical an actor is, the more ability it carries
to impact other actors and the organizational context.
Incoming dependencies towards an actor are taken into
consideration to measure the criticality of an actor. The
incoming dependencies describe responsibilities are assigned to an actor from other actor. By receiving dependencies from other actor makes the dependency receiving
actor crucial. If it fails to satisfy the incoming dependencies the depender actors are widely affected which possibly
affect the context as a whole. In order to mitigate the risks
associated with the system the criticality measurement of
actors should be taken into consideration. Measuring
critical factors of actors helps the analysts to analyze and
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construct alternative options to achieve the aim of the
system. This will alleviate the risk management and increase the robustness of the system.
Criticality of actors is measured by multiplying number
of incoming dependencies and number of depender actors.
The formula we use to assess the criticality measurement
(CM) of actors is as follows:
CM = No of Incoming Dependencies * No of Depender
Actors
For example, for actor Volunteer,
No of Incoming Dependencies = 10
No of Depender Actors = 3
So, Criticality, CM= 10*3 = 30
Table 2: Criticality Measurement of Actors
No of
No of
CriticalIncoming
Depender
Actors
ity
DependActors
encies
Emergency
Coordination
4
1
4
Centre Coordinator
Call Taking
Supervi9
3
27
sor/System
Volunteer/Emergency
10
3
30
Workers
Flood Control
9
3
27
Centre Coordinator
Weather Bu2
1
2
reau
Community
2
1
2
According to the result from Criticality Metrics, Volunteer actor is more critical than other actor in the model.
Volunteer has ten incoming dependencies from three
other actors and its existence is more crucial because if it
fails to satisfy any of the incoming dependencies received
from other three actors it will have greater impact on
other actors and to system as a whole. We have not considered the softgoal dependencies while calculating the
criticality of the actors for the same reasons of vulnerability measurement.
If an actor does not have any incoming dependencies
from another actor of the model then it portrays that the
actor has distributed his dependencies to other actor but
no other actor has delegated any tasks, resources and
goals into this actor. So the actor will have no impact on
the consequences of the performance of other actors in the
strategic context of the model. For this reason an actor
with no incoming dependencies will be positioned with no
criticality fact towards it but the vulnerability factor of

that actor will take it into the consideration of the risk
measurement in the strategic framework.

4. Integrating Risks in Business Process
Models
Treating Vulnerable Actors
We believe that every actor in the business processes
should be given a relative level of effort to mitigate vulnerability via robustness and efficiency. We suggest for the
more vulnerable actors more monitoring of the tasks/
sub-tasks is necessary. Monitoring of the business process
means tracking the individual tasks or subtask in a process
so that information on their state can be easily made visible. It is done to measure the satisfactory performance of a
business process. Business process tasks of the vulnerable
actors need more monitoring so that we can continually
refine them based on feedback that comes directly from
operational level.

Figure 2: Business Process Model in BPMN
This process model has two actors WeatherBureau and
EmergencyCoordinationCentreCoordinator (ECCC) with
few tasks and subtask. The model also represents exception
handling procedure for RecieveForecast task. From table-1, we find that ECCC is the most vulnerable actor
which implies more monitoring of the tasks and subtask
inside this process is required.

Figure 3: Extended Process Model Reflecting the Vulnerable Actor.
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The process model in figure 2 is improved in figure 3 by
using our notion of vulnerability. The exception for RecieveForecast task is handled by QueryBureau
sub-process. We extend this model by integrating ApplyRiskMitigation sub-process. This sub-process includes
the risk mitigation procedures which takes place in case of
the failure of QueryBureau sub-process.
The analyst should design the organizational model or
process model carefully while delegating the dependencies
from one actor to other actors. Actor with dependencies
over only one actor is more vulnerable then actor with
dependencies with multiple actors. For example, the
vulnerability level of actor A1 is 4 and actor B1 is 1. Actor
A1 has four dependencies over A2. If actor A2 fails then all
the dependencies will remain unsatisfied. On the other
hand actor B1 has delegated its dependencies over four
actors. If any of the four dependee actor fails one dependency will remain unsatisfied, but the others might be
satisfied. Thus actor A1 is more vulnerable than actor B1.

Figure 4: Delegation of Dependencies among Actors.
Treating Critical Actors:
Volunteer actor is the most critical actor according to the
the matrix. In this case the three actors ECCC, FieldControlCentreCoordinator(FCCC) and Community are dependant on Volunteer actor to accomplish their certain
objectives. Failure to satisfy these objectives/incoming
dependencies will have a big impact on the performance of
the depender actors and to the system as a whole. To
minimize the criticality levels of actors, the analyst needs
to have pragmatic and profound process delegation strategy.
The tasks and sub-processes of the most critical actors
should be robustly planned to make the whole process
successful. To make the process robust the analysts need to
identify what is the overall objective of the process. This
should describe problems to be solved, issues to be addressed, key participants, whether all the tasks are well

integrated within the process and how the process add
values and quality to the system.

Figure 5: Business Process Model in BPMN
The objective of the process in figure-5 is to provide a
Flood/Storm Safety advice to the Community. Volunteer
provides the safety advice to the Community. For the well
completion of the process Volunteer needs to have local
information and rescue equipments which are done by
FieldControlCenterCoordinator by accomplishing two
tasks
GatherLocalInformation
and
ArrangeRescue/EvacuationEquipment. Upon successful completion of
the task ReceiveRescueEquipments the Community receives the message ProvideFlood/StormSafetyAdvice from
Volunteer in the FollowEvacuationProcedures tasks which
add values to the process of evacuation.

Figure 6: Extended Process Model Reflecting the Critical
Actor.
The above process model is extended from figure 5 by
introducing an exception handling technique in Volunteer’s RecieveRescueEquipments task to manage its satisfactory performance. If the Volunteer does not receive the
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rescue equipments from FCCC the process will throw an
exception which sends query to FCCC. To handle the risks
from negative response from the FCCC a MitigateRisk
sub-process is introduced. Exception handling should be
taken into thoughtful consideration by the analyst as
exceptions may arise in any stages of the process.
The processes of the critical actors should have mutual
consistency to reduce criticality and increases process
performance. If a process is allocated to an actor, which the
actor may not be capable of performing, it is likely to delay
the process which could lead to a disaster. Clearly specified activities for the actors should be one of the most
important priorities to the analyst. It makes easy to comprehend and allocate resourceful process design to ease the
modification of processes.

5.

Conclusion

In this work we have presented a discussion on how we
can identify risk in terms of vulnerability and criticality in
organizational models. We have also provided a way to
integrate risks within the process model. We believe it
helps the analyst while to design organizational models,
delegate dependencies among various actors, choose
alternatives, decompose tasks, maintain consistency
among organizational and process models, handle exceptions etc. However, we have considered the concept of
vulnerability and criticality of actors only. We have not
considered our notions on the activities and sub-process for
assessing risks. Our future work will deal with the combination of actors and their tasks and sub-processes. Our
proposal is based on a combined notation (i*-BPMN)
which might not be suitable for organizations using different notations. However, we wish apply our proposal to
different notations in the future.
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Figure 1: Strategic Dependency Model of an Emergency Service Provider.
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